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From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional
Right of Privacy Mandate a Parent-Child
Privilege?
On the evening of March 26, 1977, several hundred students
were attending a dance held in the first floor cafeteria area of the
Canisuis College student center in Buffalo, New York. During the
dance the auditorium on the second floor was somehow set
ablaze. Suspecting arson, the local district attorney convened a
grand jury to conduct an investigation. The testimony elicited
from several witnesses conclusively placed "John Doe, " a sixteenyear-old, near the auditorium a t the time of the fire. Cognizant
that a juvenile may not constitutionally be forced to incriminate
himself,' the district attorney devised an ingenious, if not ingenuous, strategy to secure the juvenile's admission of the crime.l He
issued subpoenas to John's parents, seeking testimonial evidence
in the form of admissions John may have made to his parents
concerning the fire. Neither parent was in the vicinity of the
student center a t the time the alleged arson occurred and thus
neither parent had personal knowledge concerning the incident.
A motion brought by John's parents to quash the subpoenas was
granted and the district attorney appealed. Hence, the question
before the court in People v. Doe3 was whether a parent whose
minor child had come to him in the privacy of the home seeking
guidance and counsel could be compelled to divulge the substance of the potentially incriminating communication.
Of all the relationships that comprise our social fabric, the
most important exist within the familial ~ o n t e x tHence,
.~
it is not
surprising to find that nearly every state recognizes by statute or
case law an evidentiary privilege that, to one degree or another,
1. See In re Gault, 387 U S . 1 (1967).
2. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK.L. REV. 599, 600 (1970) (footnotes omitted):
In Gault, the Court held that a juvenile has a privilege against selfincrimination in the fact-finding phase of the juvenile delinquency hearing. A
court, by compelling the juvenile's parent to testify concerning matters which
the juvenile could not be forced to divulge, indirectly causes the juvenile to
incriminate himself solely because of a natural, but regrettably mistaken, belief
on his part that his conversations with his parents are private. Such surreptitious judicial practices should be proscribed.
3. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
4. See Levy, The Rights of Parents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693.
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operates to exclude from judicial consideration confidential communications between husband and wife? What is surprising is
that not a single jurisdiction recognizes an evidentiary privilege
affording such deference to parent-child communications.6
This Comment will consider the question of whether communications between parents and their minor children should, in
whole or in part, be beyond the reach of legal process. First, it will
explore in depth the nature and rationale of evidentiary privileges
with respect to parent-child communications in an attempt to
determine whether the protection of communications between
parent and child would accord with the generally accepted rationales underpinning the presently recognized privileges. Second,
the concept of family integrity and privacy will be outlined in the
light of both common law and constitutional interpretation,
which together have created a protective panoply surrounding
many aspects of family life. Whether the protections th'at inhere
in family privacy include a protection for parent-child communications will then be analyzed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Comment will attempt to define and delimit the confines of such a privilege, suggesting guidelines courts and legislatures may consider in dealing with parent-child communications.

A. Introduction
The word "privilege" is derived from the Latin phrase
"privata lex," meaning a private law applicable to a small group
of persons as their special prerogative.' Before a meaningful analysis of evidentiary privileges may be entertained, the law governing privileges must be extracted from the rules of evidence. Rules
of evidence preventing the introduction of probative facts may
generally be classed in two groups: rules of exclusion and rules of
privilege? Rules of exclusion serve either of two functions. Certain rules of exclusion attempt to maintain the integrity of the
factfinding process by barring the introduction of probative material that by its nature is unreliable or untrustworthy. Examples
-

-

-

-

5. See note 43 infra.
6. See 3 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE
$ 578 (13th ed. 1973).
L. REV.
7. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE
175, 181 (1960).
8. See MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE
$ 72 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK];
Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK.L. REV.
378, 378-79 (1950); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX.
L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938).
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of these rules include "the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the rule
rejecting proof of bad character as evidence of crime, and the rule
excluding secondary evidence until the original document is
exclusionary rules keep out
~
shown to be ~ n a v a i l a b l e . "Other
"irrelevant or immaterial matter which would prove nothing,
waste time, and sometimes actually harm the opponent by improperly calling attention to things about the opponent or his case
which might arouse prejudice or ill will against him in the minds
of the jury."1°
The practical effect of the evidentiary privilege is the same
as any of the exclusionary rules-it excepts certain classes of
evidence from judicial consideration. However, its rationale is
much different. The exclusionary rules actually facilitate the proper ascertainment of truth by excluding evidence that may be
misleading, prejudicial, or untrustworthy.ll Privileges, on the
other hand, are not an aid to the discovery of truth. They in fact
impair and often completely stifle the factfinding process.12
"Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social
importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts
needed in the administration of justice."13
The rules of privilege may conveniently be categorized into
three groups.14 The first class of privileges consists of those devoted to the protection of the rights of the individual, such as the
privilege against self-incrimination and the exclusionary rule
which proscribes the introduction of illegally obtained evidence?
9. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 8 72, a t 151.
10. Barnhart, supra note 8, a t 377.
11. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 8 72, at 152; Barnhart, supra note 8, at 377;
McCormick, supra note 8, a t 447.
ON EVIDENCE
8 2192, a t 72-73 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
12. See 8 WIGMORE
Barnhart, supra note 8, a t 377-78.
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE];
13. McCormick, supra note 8, a t 447-48 (footnote omitted). See also Fisher, The
Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE
L.
REV. 609, 609-10 (1964).
14. Coburn, supra note 2, a t 602; Fisher, supra note 13, a t 610.
15. The exclusionary rule, a t first blush, is seemingly what its name implies: a rule
of exclusion. On closer analysis, however, it is clear that the exclusionary rule is in fact a
privilege. Professor McCormick made the following observation:
Manifestly, however, the mle allowing the objection is not designed to protect
the parties against unreliable evidence. Quite the contrary. The constitutionmakers looked back to the protection of the person, the home, and the owner's
effects, against unreasonable official interference. If the court rejects the evidence, i t is not because it would shed false light on the issues, but only because
its exclusion may serve to discourage future unlawful seizures and raids. The
objection, then, seems properly classed as a claim of privilege.
McCormick, supra note 8, a t 450-51 (footnote omitted).

10021

PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE

1005

The second group of privileges is designed to maintain the
"integrity of the system of government"%nd includes the privilege accorded the government against the disclosure of informants,17the privilege afforded judges and jurors, and the privilege
that accompanies government secrets.18 The third class is composed of "privileges designed to be 'a significant expression of the
law's concern or regard for the security of the individual as a
participant in relationships which the state considers it important to foster and protect and, it should be added, for the security
and sanctity of the relationship itself.' "I9 The ambit of this class
of privileges circumscribes those privileges protecting the confidential communications of parties to certain relationships.
Since parent-child communications approximate many already privileged communications, a comparison of the nature and
context of the parent-child relationship with the nature and context of other privileged relationships will afford an opportunity to
determine whether a parent-child privilege should be recognized.
In addition, it will also provide a framework within which the
scope of the privilege may be ascertained if it is ultimately determined to merit recognition.

B. The History and Rationale of the Major Relational Privileges
At Roman law there was a form of the attorney-client privilege." Whether the Roman tradition influenced the development
of the privilege at common law is unknown,22but by the reign of
. ~ common
~
law
Elizabeth I the privilege was firmly e n t r e n ~ h e dAt
the attorney-client privilege was recognized because of the lawyer's status as a gentleman.24The courts in that day recognized
the prerogative of a gentleman not to violate a pledge of secrecy.
16. Fisher, supra note 13, at 610.
supra note 8, § 111: 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2374;
17. See generally MCCORMICK,
71 DICK.L. REV. 366 (1967).
supra note 8, §§ 106-113.
18. See generally MCCORMICK,
19. Coburn, supra note 2, at 602-03 (quoting Smith, Reintegrating Our Concepts of
Privileged Communicants, 16 SOC.SEW. REV. 191, 193 (1942)).
20. See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 87; 8 WICMORE,
supra note 12, 54 22902291; Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIOST. L.J.
1 (1963); Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
lmplications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALEL.J.1226 (1962).
21. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALIF.L. REV.487, 488 (1928).
22. Id. at 489.
supra note 12, § 2290, at 543.
23. 8 WIGMORE,
24. Id.; Radin, supra note 21, at 487.
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The privilege accorded gentlemen gradually eroded due to judicial views that the need for truth overshadowed the importance
of a gentleman's honor.25The lawyer, however, was able to retain
the exemption as the rationale supporting the privilege underwent a significant change. Rather than being a consideration for
the oath and honor of the attorney,*' the new rationale became
"the necessity of providing subjectively for the client's freedom
of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser."27Today, the
privilege is recognized in every state."

Early common law prevented interested parties from testifying in their own causes.30It was also believed that the husband
and wife were a single entity before the law.31The logical consequence of these two propositions was that a person became wholly
incompetent to testify in any action either for or against his
spouse.32 "Contemporanous with, and perhaps pre-existing the
incompetency"" rule, some courts held that a witness could testify in his spouse's behalf, but the party-spouse could prevent the
other from testifying against him.34This has been called the
"privilege for anti-marital facts."35The disqualification of husbands and wives was abolished by statute in England in 185336
and was replaced by a rule that sought to prevent disclosure of
communications between husband and wife.37The general disposition of the legislatures and courts in the United States has been
25. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 87, a t 175.
supra note 12, § 2290, a t 543.
26. 8 WIGMORE,
27. Id. a t 543 (emphasis in original).
28. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALEL.J. 1226, 1227 & n.7
( 1962).
29. See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 78; 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, $ 4 22272228, 2332-2333; The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw.
U.L. REV. 208 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Husband- Wife Privileges].
30. Husband- WifePrivileges, supra note 29, a t 208; Note, Competency of One Spouse
to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to
Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 VA.L. REV. 359, 359 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as Confidential Communications].
31. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations, 13 MINN.L. REV.675, 675 (1929); Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, at
208; Confidential Communications, supra note 30, a t 359.
32. Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t 208; Confidental Communications,
supra note 30, at 359. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 31, a t 675.
33. Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t 209 (footnote omitted).
supra note 12, § 2227, a t 211 & n.1.
34. 8 WIGMORE,
35. Id.
36. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 78, a t 161.
37. Id.
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to follow the privileged communications rule, although some jurisdictions adhere to both the antimarital facts rule and and the
privileged communications rule.38
The marital communications privilege is the natural consequence of a belief that marital commnications must be protected
to maintain the harmony, confidentiality, and freedom of communication necessary to the proper functioning of the relati~n.~'
This rationale for the privilege is not universally accepted, however." The other rationale generally advanced'in support of the
privilege is that forcing one spouse to disclose the contents of
confidential communications is so repugnant that it is judicially
n~npalatable.~'
This putative justification for the existence of the
privilege also has its detractors." Whether these suggested rationales truly justify the existence of the privilege is largely a matter
of academic debate in view of the fact that adherence to the
privilege is nearly universal.43
Once the pledge of secrecy afforded gentlemen was no longer
recognized in the English courts, any deference that may have
been accorded the physician-patient relationship by the common
38. See Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t 218 & n.50.
39. See Husband-Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t 218; Confidential
rule 215,
Communications, supra note 30, a t 359. See also MODELCODEOF EVIDENCE
Comment a (1942).
supra note 12, 4 2228, a t 216:
40. E.g., 8 WIGMORE,
[Tlhe peace of families does not essentially depend on this immunity from
compulsory testimony, and . . . so far as i t might be affected, that result is not
to be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice to others. When one thinks of
the multifold circumstances of life that contribute to cause marital dissension,
the liability to give unfavorable testimony appears as only a casual and minor
one, not to be exaggerated into a foundation for so important a rule. I t is incorrect to assume that there exists in the normal domestic union a n imminent
danger of shattering an ideal state of harmony solely by the liability to testify
unfavorably.
Despite this criticism of the antimarital facts privilege and its disqualification aspect,
Wigmore would allow the privileged communications rule. Id. 4 2332, a t 643.
supra note 12, 4 2228, a t 217; Coburn, supra note 2, a t 610 (footnote
41. 8 WIGMORE,
omitted); Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t 218-19.
supra note 12, 4 2228, a t 217-18. Even though Wigmore critizes
42. See 8 WIGMORE,
the "repugnancy rationale" in the context of the privilege for antimarital facts, he does
accept the existence of a privilege for marital communications. Id. 4 2332, a t 643.
43. "Every state has adopted some form of legislation on the subject . . . ."
Confidential Communications, supra note 30, a t 360. For a selection of statutes that deal
with this topic, see 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, 4 4.88, a t 525 n.2.
44. See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, $$98-105; 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, $4
2380-2391.
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law was at an end." In this country statutory grants of the privilege were made as early as 1828,4hnda t the present time over
two-thirds of the states have statutes recognizing this pri~ilege.~'
The major policy rationale supporting the privilege is the belief
that if patients know confidential communications with their
physicians might later be revealed, they will never disclose all of
the facts necessary to the effective treatment of their illnesses or
affliction^.^^ The immediate effect of the privilege-shielding the
patient from embarrassment and invasion of his privacy-may be
a second reason for maintaining the p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~

Though there is some dispute whether the priest-penitent
privilege existed at common law,51it has now been adopted in all
but four of the fifty states? The major policy rationale supporting this privilege is a "fear that the relationships would not be
'wholesome' or effective if there were any fear of disclosure of
confidence~."~~
"A more reasonable justification for the privilege
is that compelling priests to divulge the substance of communicat i o n ~ "is~simply
~
so repugnant that it has been proscribed.

C. Limitations on the Scope of the Relational Privileges
Since privileges obstruct the search for truth, the creation of
45. 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, (5 2380.
supra note 8, (5 98, a t 212.
46. MCCORMICK,
s u p p note 8, (5 98, a t 212. These statutes are compiled and recited
47. MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, (5 2380, a t 819 n.5.
in 8 WIGMORE,
48. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, # 98, a t 213. See Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84
S.E.2d 297, 298 (1954).
49. See, e.g., Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 831, 273 N.W. 478 (1937)
(the privilege enables the patient to secure medical treatment without fear of betrayal);
Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters, Inc., 271 N.Y. 228,2 N.E.2d 638 (1936) (the privilege prevents the physician from disclosing matters that might humiliate the patient).
supra note 12, (58 2394-2396; Callahan, Historical In50. See generally 8 WIGMORE,
quiry into the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST 328 (1976); Hogan, A Modern Problem
on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1951); Stoyles, The Dilemma of the
Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion
Clauses, 29 U . Prrr. L.REV. 27 (1967).
51. The "consensus of the authorities" is that the priest-penitent privilege did not
supra note 12,
exist a t common law. Stoyles, supra note 50, a t 32 & n.24. See 8 WIGMORE,
(5 2394. Contra, Hogan, supra note 50, a t 7-14.
52. MCCORMICK,supra note 8, (5 77, a t 158. The statutes are collected in 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, (5 2395, a t 873 n.1.
53. Fisher, supra note 13, a t 621-22.
54. Coburn, supra note 2, a t 609-10.
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new privileges and the maintenance of a broad scope for existing
ones has generally been met with disfavor by both courtsss and
commentators.~This judicial and commentatorial "war" on the
privileged communications doctrine, with advocates calling for
either a complete abolition of certain privileges5' or their limitation, has exerted a substantial influence tending to restrict the
scope of all relational privileges. Even the most ardent supporters
of an expansive role for privileged communications have agreed
the scope of such communications must be reasonably limited?
The result of the antipathy toward privileges in general has been
a significant factor in the creation of numerous exceptions to all
relational privileges. A brief summary of those exceptions will be
discussed in Section V.

A parent-child privilege would comport very well with the
basic notions behind the relational privileges. It would be hard
to imagine a situation that more strikingly reflects an intimate
and confidential relation than that which exists between parent
and child when a distressed young person, perhaps filled with
remorse and fear, turns to his parents for counsel and guidance.
Indeed, this was a portion of the rationale behind the court's
decision in People u. Doe.
[Tlhe thought of the State forcing a mother and father to reveal their child's alleged misdeeds, as confessed to them in private, to provide the basis for criminal charges is shocking to our
sense of decency, fairness and propriety. It is inconsistent with
the way of life we cherish and guard so carefully and raises a
specter of a regime which encourages betrayal of one's offspring.59
55. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, McMann v. Engel, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
supra note 8, 4 79, a t 165; 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, Ej
56. See, e.g., MCCORMICK,
2192; Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctork Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALEL.J. 607 (1943); McCormick, Law and
the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U.L. REV.218, 220-21 (1956); Morgan, Some Observations
('oncerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. PA.L. REV. 145, 150-54 (1940); Morgan,
Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHI.
L. REV. 285, 286-92 (1943).
57. Wigmore argued for the abolition of the physician-patient privilege. 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, 4 2380a.
58. See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 7, a t 179-81.
59. 61 A.D.2d a t 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d a t 380.
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Hence, compelled disclosure of such confidences may be so repugnant that it should be proscribed on this basis alone. The repugnance argument has as much force in this context as in the context of any of the relational privileges.
An adolescent's knowledge that his parents may be compelled to reveal confidential communications may seriously impair the adolescent's willingness to confide in his parents. Just as
a privilege in other contexts ostensibly has the purpose of promoting relations by guarding against apprehension of disclosure, a
privilege in the parent-child context arguably would maintain the
freedom of communication necessary to the healthy existence of
the parent-child relationship. This is not the only manner by
which a rationale supporting recognition of a parent-child privilege can be developed, however. The traditional method of analyzing "new" privileges is attributed to Dean Wigmore.
The "Wigmore test"" has been applied both by scholarsMin
attempts to determine whether a privilege should be recognized
by statute, and by courW2 in determining whether a privilege
should be recognized in a particular fact situation. The test consists of four parts.
'

(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
( 3 ) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigati~n.~:~

Whether the parent-child privilege meets the requirements of the
Wigmore test has been discussed fully elsewhereUand the question has been answered affirmatively.
There is an additional advantage to be gained by recognition
of the parent-child privilege. If, as likely, the parent refuses to
-

-

60. 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, 5 2285.
61. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 13, at 611-12; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity
and Confusion: Privileges in the Federal Court Today, 31 TUL.L. REV. 101, 111 (1956);
Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U . C I N .L. REV.537, 538-39
(1957); Slovenko, supra note 7, at 184-94.
62. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411,417 (Alas. 1976); State v. Bixby, 27 Wash.
2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947).
supra note 12, 5 2285.
63. 8 WICMORE,
64. Coburn, supra note 2, at 622-32.

PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
testify, he has but two alternatives. He may refuse to testify and
subject himself to contempt proceedings, or he may deliberately
commit perjury and assume the risk of criminal prosecution. The
latter course of conduct can only serve to convince the child, who
may be guilty of antisocial conduct, that "two wrongs do make a
right" and that "crime does pay,"" while the former course of
conduct would tend to lead the child to question the fairness of
the legal system.66
The fact the parent-child relationship fully accords with the
basic rationale of provileges and likely meets the requirements of
the Wigmore test may be of some import when and if a legislature
considers adopting a statute creating such a privilege. It is unlikely, however, that these arguments would persuade a court to
recognize such a privilege; judicial privilegemaking came to a
virtual halt a century ago." The state interest in providing judicial proceedings with all relevant facts is considered so important,
especially to judges, that it may simply overwhelm the arguments
favoring the recognition of the privilege. As the Supreme Court
noted in United States v. Nixon?
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system
is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated if judgements were to be founded on
a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all of the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it
is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process
be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.69

Mere policy arguments, irrespective of their cogency, cannot
be expected to persuade a court to create a privilege covering
parent-child communications. It is clear that privilegemaking is
now viewed as a function devolving exclusively on the legislature.'O There are, however, constitutional dimensions to the ques65. Id. at 629.
66. Id. at 628-29.
67. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 77, at 156. Courts in this country have indulged in
privilegemaking only rarely in recent history. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d
275,279 (D.C..Cir. 1959) (Fahy, J., concurring);Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alas. 1976);
Binder v. Ruvell, 150 A.M.A.J. 1241 (1952) (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1952).
68. 418 US. 683 (1974).
69. Id. at 709.
70. Even the Doe court felt disposed to leave the privilegemaking function to the
legislature. 61 A.D.2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
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tion of parent-child communicative privacy which may compel
courts to recognize such a privilege.

IV.

RECOGNITION
OF THE PARENT-CHILD
PRIVILEGE
AS A

CONSTITUTIONAL
MATTER
A. Early Protections of Familial Rights
The common law of both England and the United States took
cognizance of the family as the primordial social, political, and
economic unit,71affording it such deference that the family became a legally autonomous unit.72Familial autonomy was characterized as an "inherent, natural right, for the protection of which,
just as much for the protection of the rights of the individual to
life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, our government is
f~rrned."'~
This legal panoply constructed around the family was
later incorporated with even greater force into the constitutional
law of the United States.
The constitutional protection of familial autonomy has its
-

-

-

-

-

-

71. See Hafen, Childrenls Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations A bout Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y .U. L. REV.605, 615; Note,
The Fundamental Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster Care
Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN
L. REV.63, 66-70 (1977).
72. Note, The Fundamental Right to Family 'Integrity and Its Role in New York
Foster Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN
L. REV.63, 66-68 (1977) (footnotes omitted):
At common law, parents have been presumptively entitled to the custody of
their children, thereby enabling the family to perform its historic functions.
Parental custody, perhaps the most basic component of the right to family
integrity, involves more than mere physical control of children. It includes other
duties: the support and care of one's children and the control over their conduct
by instruction and discipline. And it includes other rights: the right to utilize
the services of one's children, to share their companionship, and to supervise
their moral, religious, and intellectual education. Although these additional
rights and duties flow from the parents' physical custody of their children, they
do not depend on immediate physical control. For example, parents whose children are in school have in effect delegated part of their right to educate their
children, but they may still legally supervise the children's course of study and
veto particular aspects of it. And if parents separate, the duty to support may
remain in the father even though the mother has physical custody.
At common law, children, too, can claim rights to family integrity. Their
rights and duties are often reciprocal to those of their parents-for example, the
child's right to receive and the parent's duty to provide support and the child's
duty to perform and parental right to the benefit of the child's services. Children
may also claim under a mutual right of parent and child to a continuing heritage-the parent has a right to rear and teach his child, and the child has a right
to he brought up by, and learn from, his own parent. That children have an
assertable interest in parental custody belies the much-disputed but still fashionable theory that, at common law, children were treated as the chattel of their
parents.
73. Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 569-70, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (1922).
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roots in substantive due proce~s.'~
Although substantive due process had its heyday in the economic and social sphere, the doctrine was also applied in areas involving familial rights." The
economic utilization of substantive due process was repudiated in
~
of a "minimum rationality" test" and was,
the 1 9 3 0 ' ~in~ favor
in the words of Justice Black, "laid . . . to rest once and for all."7X
That portion of substantive due process that called into play a
heightened judicial scrutiny in the areas of familial or personal
rights, however, was never explicitly overturned. In fact its continued existence was noted by Justice Stone in his famous foot74. Substantive due process "refers to the principle that a law adversely affecting a n
individual's life, liberty, or property is invalid, even though offending no specific constitutional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate governmental objective." Perry,
Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw.
U.L. REV.417, 419 (1976). I t has also been characterized as "the judicial practice of
constitutionalizing values that cannot fairly be inferred from the constitutional text, the
structure of governmental ordained by the Constitution, or historical materials clarifying
otherwise vague constitutional provisions." Id. (footnote omitted).
The doctrine of substantive due process first emerged in the dissenting opinions of
the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-130 (1873), wherein the view was
expressed that the fourteenth amendment imposed a substantive restraint on state legislation. Id. a t 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley's seemingly bold assertion was
simply the exposition of the older theme of "natural law" which others a t an earlier date
had attempted to import into the Constitution. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798) (Chase, J., separate opinion). The doctrine of substantive due process first persuaded a majority of the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
75. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court reversed the conviction of a teacher who had
taught German in a public school in violation of a state statute prohibiting the teaching
of foreign languages to young children. Justice McReynolds thought that the "liberty" of
the due process clause encompassed personal as well as economic rights.
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to many, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized a t common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
262 U.S. a t 399. Justice McReynolds found that the Nebraska law interfered with the
calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of children to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control their child's education. Id. a t 401.
In Pierce the Court sustained a challenge to a statute requiring children to attend only
public schools because the law interfered "with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing of children under their control." 268 U.S. a t 534-35.
76. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
77. The minimum rationality test meant the Court would no longer make a meaningful scrutiny of economic regulations beyond that envisioned in the rational basis test. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
78. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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note to United States v. Carolene Products C O . ?precisely
~
at a
time when the economic and social utilization of substantive due
. ~ ~distinction drawn between
process was clearly in d i s r e p ~ t eThe
economic and personal rights was implicitly given life by subsequent cases that, although not explicitly relying on the due process clause, seemingly utilized the principle to protect personal
rights not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights? Personal
(as well as familial) rights were viewed as coming to the Court
"with a momentum for respect lacking when an appeal is made
to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements. "82

B. Familial Autonomy and t h e Right of Privacy
1. General contours of the right of privacy
The newest phase of constitutional protection for familial
rights had its genesis in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut. " In that
case the Court struck down a Connecticut law which forbade the
use of contraceptives even by married couples. After rejecting an
invitation to utilize Lochner in the resolution of the contr~versy,~"
the majority reasoned that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights
created penumbras of constitutional protection that, although
not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, must be recognized since "[wlithout those peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure."" The penumbral rights of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments, taken together, created a "zone of
privacy" which, absent certain circumstances, the state could not
enter.V'he right of privacy guarantee has been called the "new
due process"87 and rightly so, for the Court has explicitly recognized that the privacy cases actually rest on the "liberty" interest
protected by the due process clause.R8Even when Griswold was
79. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
80. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v . New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
81. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965);Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
82. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
83. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84. Id. at 482.
85. Id. at 482-83.
86. Id. at 484-86.
87. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and t h e Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.43; 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.977, 980-81.
88. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 & n.23 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
( 197.3).
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handed down, many recognized that it was simply substantive
due process under another nameeSg
"The concept of a constitutional right to privacy still remains largely ~ n d e f i n e d . "In
~ ~ Whalen v. Roeg1the Court attempted to bring some order to the area by recognizing that
"[tlhe cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy'
have in fact involved at least two kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decision^."^^ These divergent "strands" of privacy
have elicited two separate responses from the Supreme Court.
The protection accorded the interest in confidentiality is arguably not as great as the protection afforded the decisionmaking
autonomy interestg3In the autonomy area, if the governmental
intrusion invades a "fundamental" personal right,g4the intrusion
will be allowed only if there is a "sufficiently compelling state
interest."95 Even with the presence of a compelling state interest,
however, the state's intrusion upon the right must be no broader
than is necessary. That is, the " 'governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' " g l
2. Parent-child communicative privacy as a fundamental right

Before a particular autonomy interest may legitimately fall
under the protective umbrella of the right of privacy, it must be
89. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH.L. REV.235, 251-54 (1965).
90. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (quoting Kurland, The Prioate I,
U. OF CHI. MAGAZINE,
Autumn 1976, a t 7, 8).
91. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
92. Id. a t 598-99 (footnotes omitted).
93. The Court has only considered the confidentiality branch of the right of privacy
two times. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Because the possibility of public disclosure was so remote, the Court
in Whalen v . Roe did not discuss what test, if any, should be applied in such cases. In
Nixon, the Court recognized Nixon's legitimate expectation of privacy in some of his
Presidential papers and balanced the respective interests of Nixon against those of the
law. Since the public interest was important and the screening necessary, the balance was
struck in favor of the government. Thus, the test in the confidentiality strand of the right
of privacy involves balancing, with the scales preweighted slightly in the individual's
favor. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978). The test in the autonomy strand of the right of privacy is much more stringent, requiring a showing of a
"compelling state interest" to override an individual's claim of privacy. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
95. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (emphasis added).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 485 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
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determined that the interest is fundamental." The initial focus
of judicial scrutiny is thus shifted away from the alleged constitutional infringement to the nature of the right itself. The Supreme
Court has characterized the fundamental rights protected by the
automony strand of the right of privacy as including "matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education. "YY Also regarded
as fundamental are activities related to the right of families to
live together;ss the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children;Io0and the right to associate with family
members.""
Taken collectively, these decisions comprise a right of familial autonomy; i.e . , the right of the family as a unit to be free from
undue governmental influence in making certain decisions and in
engaging in certain activities. The question here is whether the
interest of parent and child in communicative privacy is fundamental and thus incidental to the right of familial autonomy.
Since parent-child communications are a t the very heart of family life and relationships, they can properly be classed as fundamental along with those familial rights that the automony strand
of the right of privacy is designed to protect. Consonant with this
anaylsis, the court in People u. Doe refused to disturb the lower
court's ruling that Doe's parents need not testify concerning the
substance of any confidential communications they may have
had with their son.Io2The court thus followed such venerable
familial autonomy precedents as Meyer v.
Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, and Stanley v. Illinois, I" which all afforded
the parent-child relationship some measure of constitutional protection.IM
The view of the court in Doe that parent-child communicative privacy is a fundamental right was not, of course, the only
view the court could have taken. In re Terry W.Irn involved essen97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
98. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (emphasis added).
99. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
100. See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp.
1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
101. Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977).
102. 61 A.D.2d a t 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
103. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
104. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
105. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
106. Stanley dealt with the right of a father to the custody and companionship of his
children. The rights of parent and child protected by Meyer and Pierce are discussed in
note 75 supra.
107. 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976).
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tially the same question presented in Doe. In that case the only
evidence linking Terry W. with a burglary was an alleged confession to his mother, who desired to testify as to the substance of
the confession in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Terry
claimed the communication was constitutionally protected by his
right of privacy and should therefore be excluded from the proceeding. In ruling to allow the testimony, the court refused to
extend the right of privacy to protect such communications, reasoning that the right was limited to husband and wife.'" While
the court may have had justifiable reasons for not basing a
parent-child privilege on the right of privacy in the circumstances
before it,Io9the court's apparent rationale-that the right of privacy does not include the parent-child relationship-was without
merit.
3.

Compulsory disclosure as a violation of the right of privacy

.

Another issue involved in right of privacy analysis is whether
the inhibiting effect of compulsory disclosure constitutes a direct
or incidental burden on parent-child communications. This
direct-incidental burden dichotomy was an important factor in
Justice White's majority opinion in Branr burg v. Hayes, 'lo a case
with a setting similar to the situation in Doe, but involving an
explicit constitutional right-freedom of the press. In that case,
the district attorney was attempting to force a reporter to reveal
the sources of information he had utilized in writing a story relating to criminal activities. Just as Doe argued that disclosure or
the prospect of disclosure would create an atmosphere in which
parent-child communications would be impaired,lI1 the reporter
argued that disclosure would destroy relationships and potential
relationships between a reporter and his sources. Both cases arguably involved the infringement of a fundamental right-Doe's
right to privacy and Branzburg's right to freedom of the press.
In response to the claim that compelled disclosure violated
the reporter's fundamental interest in freedom of the press, the
Branzburg majority noted that the "First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result
from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general appl108.
109.
110.
111.
( 1978).

Id. at 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15.
See notes 156-63 and accompanying text infra.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Brief for Respondent at 14-16, People v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375
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icability."lI2 In cases raising the claim of governmental intrusion
upon fundamental interests, there must be more than an
"indirect" effect produced by the governmental activity on the
interest,lt3 or, stated differently, the threat of interference with
the fundamental right posed by the governmental activity must
be "sufficiently grievous" to "establish a constitutional violaCourt reasoned that since the "inhibiting
t i ~ n . " ~ l T hBranzburg
e
effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make
disclosures" to newsmen was speculative,115the burden on free
press could only be incidental and no violation of a fundamental
interest had occurred.
Arguably, forcing disclosure of parent-child communications
would only indirectly or incidentally burden that fundamental
interest. The state does not directly place a restraint on what the
communicants may or may not say, nor does it threaten the vast
bulk of confidential communications between parent and child.
It could be argued that the truly important communications between parent and child have little to do with crimes the child may
have committed: of the thousands of communications between
parent and child, those involving discussion of the child's legal
misdeeds would be minuscule. In any event, it may be expecting
too much of the adolescent mind to believe that a child who
would otherwise admit legal wrongdoing to parents would, knowing that a parent could later be compelled to testify concerning
his confession, be deterred in making such communications. Any
"chilling effect" on the child, or the parent for that matter, is just
as incidental a burden in this case as in the case of the reporter
and his source.
It can persuasively be maintained, however, that the burden
on the fundamental interest of parents and children in communicative privacy rises to the violation of a constitutional right. Irrespective of whether a burden on a constitutional right is consid112. 408 U S . at 682 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), in its equal protection analysis the Court differentiated the burden there on the right to marry and the burden on
the same right in another case, Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). For the Court, the
difference in the outcome of the two cases was explained by the fact that the governmental
intrusion in Jobst was only indirect, while the interference in Redhail was direct. See also
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U S . 589 (1977) (confidentiality interest of the right of privacy not
burdened because the supposed governmental interference was not "sufficiently p i evious"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U S . 665 (1972) (freedom of press only incidentally
burdened); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1131-32 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1978) ("secondary
effects" on familial privacy are not enough to establish a violation of the right).
114. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U S . 589, 600 (1977).
115. 408 U.S. at 693-94.
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ered indirect or incidental, it is still a burden and "a little impairment of constitutional rights is no more possible than it is possible for a girl to be just a little pregnant."ll"ven
incidental burdens on constitutional rights should not be tolerated. All of the
major relational privileges are based primarily on the theory that
a privilege is necessary in a particular context to assure freedom
of disclosure117and thus prevent any "chilling effects" on the
communicant's desires to communicate. It is. because of these
potentially adverse effects on confidential communications that
relational privileges are widely accepted and have continued to
expand in their number and scope.l18 The number and scope of
privileges suggest that these chilling effects are substantial.
Perhaps most importantly, the comparison between the
newsman-sourcerelationship and that of parent-child is unfitting
a t best. Both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the respective relationships are different. A source does not rely on a
newsman for love, support, and guidance as a child relies on his
parent, nor are the types of trust and confidence essential to the
relationships comparable. As the court in Doe noted:
Child psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree
that it is essential to the parent-child relationship that the lines
of communication remain open and that the child be encouraged to "talk out" his problems. It is therefore critical to a
child's emotional development that he know that he may explore his problems in an atmosphere of trust and understanding
without fear that his confidences will later be revealed to other~."~

If the newsman loses access to his source because of a breach
of trust or because of apprehension of disclosure on the part of the
source, the newsman may find another fountain of information
and arguably the right of free press has not been infringed. However, after forced disclosure in the parent-child context, the child
is not able to find new parents. Once the parent is compelled to
divulge confidences which may incriminate the child, the right of
the child to the guidance and counsel of his parents may be effectively lost.120 If his parents have previously been compelled to
116. Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76, 77 (1966).
117. See notes 27, 39, 48, 53 and accompanying text supra.
118. There are now privileges covering journalists, accountants, psychologists, confidential clerks or stenographers, public school teachers, psychiatrists, and social workers.
See 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2286.
119. 61 A.D.2d at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (footnote omitted).
120. If parents have the constitutional right to guide and counsel their children, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
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reveal his confidences and the child, rightly or wrongly, now refuses to confide in them, to whom will the child turn when he
needs counsel and guidance the most?lZ1There is a great difference between requiring a newsman to dig deeper and harder for
news and requiring a parent to breach a trust affecting the quality
of a relationship having the single greatest influence on his child's
entire future life.
4.

Compelling state interest test

The mere fact that an aspect of the fundamental right of
familial autonomy may be burdened does not of itself compel the
recognition of a parent-child privilege. The particular autonomy
interest may nevertheless be regulated if there is a "sufficiently
compelling state interest."l2"n Branzburg the Court pointed out
that the state interest in factfinding was at least impelling: "Fair
and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the
person and property of the individual is a fundamental function
of government."ln There can be little doubt the state interest in
the investigation of crime is an important one, and thus it may
be argued that despite any constitutional infringement the state
should prevail. However, when governmental activity encroaches
on a bona fide fundamental interest, recognition that the state
interest is vital is not dispositive. For example, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,'" after recognizing that the state interest in education
"ranks at the very apex of the function of a state,"12Vhe Court
refused to accept the state's claim that its interest was free from
a balancing process. The Court noted that "a State's interest
. . . , however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and in-

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U S . 390 (1923), surely children have the right to receive that
counsel and guidance.
121. Doe's counsel persuasively argued:
How can a parent be expected to effectively exercise his right and discharge his
duty to appropriately guide the child in accordance with a perception of his best
interests? Will parent and child ever be a t peace to again live within the tranquil
and free atmosphere of their home after a parent has been compelled to testify
concerning communications conveyed to him in confidence by his minor child
and perhaps disclose facts which may incriminate him? Will the child ever feel
free to speak confidentially to his parent again?
Brief for Respondent at 15, People v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
122. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U S . 678, 686 (1977) (emphasis added).
123. 408 U S . a t 690 (emphasis added).
124. 406 U S . 205 (1972).
125. Id. a t 213.
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terests."l2"he
state interest must be sufficiently compelling.iYi
The state's interest in investigation of crime and the accumulation of all facts relevant to a judicial proceeding is unquestionably one of its most important interests. Neither can it be
denied that a privilege in many cases interferes with that interest
or may even stifle it completely. Compelling a parent to testify
"may be not only a highly convenient aid to accurate fact finding,
but in some instances [it may be] the sine qua non of discovery
of the full truth."12nAdditionally, "[e]xemptions lessen the fairness of a trial, inasmuch as a trial is only as good as the evidence
considered by the court."129Recognition of the parent-child privilege will not find favor with evidence scholars whose antipathy
toward all privileges arises from the belief that the preeminent
position of the state interest in factfinding requires a subordination of the values of confidentiality in nearly all relational context~?~
Yet this state interest should not and can not be exalted to
the status of an absolute. If this interest were absolute, there
would be no requirement of probable cause, no prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures, and certainly no privilege
against self-incrimination. The contemporaneous existence of
these rights and the state interest in accumulation of facts demonstrates that "there are things even more important to human
~~~
Louisell has
liberty than accurate a d j ~ d i c a t i o n . "Professor
noted that:
It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently
is of European law and is generally in western society, that
whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by
recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for
secrecy in certain communicative relations . . . .132

There is a cluster of familial rights which antedates both the
state and its interests. These rights have enjoyed a position of
judicial preference since the early days of common law and that
preference was incorporated into the constitutional law of this

126. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
127. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
128. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part 11, 41 MINN.L. REV.731,
750 (1957).
129. Slovenko, supra note 7, at 177.
130. See, e.g., MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 79, at 165; 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12,
§ 2192.
131. Louisell, supra note 61, at 110.
132. Id.
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country more than fifty years ago? It should be clear that
the family unit does not simply co-exist with our constitutional
system; it is an integral part of it. In democratic theory as well
as in practice, it is in the family that children are expected to
learn the values and beliefs that democratic institutions later
draw on to determine group directions. The immensely important power of deciding about matters of early socialization has
been allocated to the family, not to the g0~ernment.I~~

Not only has the state been hesitant to intervene in family affairs,
it is in fact inadequate to perform essential family functions-such as the guidance and counseling of children in trouble. 135
A careful consideration of the importance of the right of familial autonomy in general and of the parent-child relationship in
particular clearly demonstrates that parent-child communications constitute a portion of the "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."lM The state interest in making
available all relevant facts in a judicial proceeding must give way
to this fundamental constitutional right. Generally the state has
at its command all of the resources necessary for effective fact
investigation without the need to intrude on the communications
of parent and child. The idea that familial communications must
be reached by the state to ensure effective law enforcement was
never accepted at Roman law,ls7and the prevailing view in the
civil law countries of Western Europe for many years has been
that no one may be forced to divulge confidences between himself
and another family member.l3 The idea that such communications merit some sort of legal protection is certainly not novel.
133. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
134. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics,
53 B.U.L. REV.765, 772-73 (1973).
A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT,BEYOND
THE BESTINTERESTS
OF THE CHILD
135. J. GOLDSTEIN,
49-50 (1973):
The law, as far as specific individual relationships are concerned, is a relatively
crude instrument. . . . It neither has the sensitivity nor the resources to maintain or supervise the ongoing day-to-day happenings between parent and
child-and these are essential to meeting ever-changing demands and needs.
Nor does it have the capacity to predict future events and needs, which would
justify or make workable over the long run any specific conditions it might
impose concerning, for example, education, visitation, health care, or religious
upbringing.
136. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
137. See Radin, supra note 21, a t 488.
138. See, e.g., 7 AMERICANSERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL
CODES,French Code of Civil
Procedure Q 335 (G. Koch trans. 1963); 9 id., German Code of Criminal Procedure 8 52(3)
(H. Niebler trans. 1965); 15 id., Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, ch. 36, Q 3 (A.
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5. Striking the balance
The balance struck in cases involving fundamental autonomy interests and important state interests does not have to be
an all-or-nothing proposition: the question need not be one of
total immunity or total disclosure. In Roe u. Wade'39those asserting the autonomy strand of privacy in the abortion context argued
a woman should have complete independence in making the decision of whether to abort the fetus,14Whilethe state insisted it had
a compelling interest in the life of the unborn child which made
any decision to abort subject to regulation.I4' The Court agreed
the autonomy interest in making the abortion decision was constitutionally protected, yet did not go so far as to entirely subordinate the state interest to the autonomy interest. The Court held
the state interest was not sufficient to overcome the woman's
privacy interest during the first trimester of pregnancy,Id2but
after that point the state interest became compelling enough to
subordinate the privacy interest. ld3
The conclusion that parent-child communications should be
included in the right of familial autonomy does not mean that all
such communications require constitutional protection, just as
the view that a woman's decision to have an abortion was constitutionally protected did not mean that under no circumstances
could t h e s t a t e regulate her decision. I t simply means
"communications made by a minor child to his parents within the
context of the family relationship may, under some
circumstances, lie within the 'private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.'
Even though such a right may justify
the refusal of Doe's parents to testify concerning confidential
communications, it does not necessarily require that Terry's
mother remain silent at a juvenile delinquency hearing when she
believes her son's best interests would be served by disclosure.

The creation and delimitation of privileges is a matter that
Bruzelius & R. Ginsburg trans. 1967). Apparently neither Soviet law, 1 V. GSOVSKI,
SOVIET
LAW,118-19 (1948), nor English law, Phipson on Evidence $0 581-587 (11th ed. 1970),
CIVIL
allow such a privilege.
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. Id. at 156.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 163.
143. Id.
144. 61 A.D.2d at 435,403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (emphasis added) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 158, 166 (1944)).
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in modern experience has almost exclusively been left to legislative judgment.lJ5Even though the court in Doe sanctioned the
prerogative of the parents not to testify and in so doing implicitly
recognized a parent-child privilege, it explicitly refused the invitation to create a full "privilege" despite its belief parent-child
communications met the requirements of Wigmore's test.Id6Although the court held that under some circumstances communications made by a minor to his parents in the family context were
constitutionally privileged, the court expressed its belief that
"the creation of a privilege .devolves exclusively on the Legislature."ld7While the court cannot be faulted for refusing to create
a "privilege," such a result is unsatisfactory because it fails to
establish a uniform approach to the question.
Just as the established relational privileges are not extended
to situations where extension is not necessary to further the purpose of the privilege, it may reasonably be expected that a parentchild privilege would not be and should not be available in situations where it is nether logically nor constitutionally necessary.
Exceptions to the privacy afforded parent-child communications,
however, may be made only where there is a constitutional as
opposed to a social reason for doing so. The remainder of this
Section investigates possible exceptions to and limitations of the
parent -child privilege.

The Confidentiality Requirement
If a communication is to be protected by the panoply of
privilege, it must have been made in confidence. This general rule
is applicable to all the major relational privilegesld8and comports
with the reasoning supporting most privileges. If the parties involved did not care to maintain the secrecy of the communication, the revelation of such conversations cannot be thought to be
repugnant. Nor can it be said the need to avoid apprehension of
disclosure protects communications that are nonconfidential in
nature. If the parties themselves have revealed the confidence to
third parties, the parties have manifested that no such apprehension exists. In privacy cases, the known presence of third parties
A.

145. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, Q 77, at 156.
146. 61 A.D.2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
147. Id.
148. This is true of the husband-wife privilege, MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, Q 80;
the priest-penitent privilege, Stoyles, supra note 50, at 36-37; the attorney-client privilege, 8 WIGMORE,
supm note 12, $9 2311-2313; and the physician-patient privilege, McSUPM note 8, Q 101.
CORMICK,
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to an act, that if done in private would be constitutionally protected, vitiates the constitutional protection afforded by the right
of privacy.I4' Thus, a legislature or court could constitutionally
impose a confidentiality requirement on the parent-child privilege. The question is, would it be wise to do so?
Many children, due to their relative immaturity, simply cannot be expected to act like adults. They may have no conception
of what it means to communicate in private. Additionally, the
normal family household may well be a place wherein privacy is
unattainable. The presence of other family members during such
communications may not only be probable, but may in fact be
impossible to avoid. It may therefore be necessary to prevent
other family members from testifying to protect the intimacy of
parent-child communications. However, courts and legislatures
could go one step further. If in fact the familial right of privacy
protects parent-child communications, that protection should
attach unless the communicants knowingly admit a third party
to the confidential communication. This would accord with standard constitutional doctrine-waiver of constitutional rights
must be knowing and informed.150

B. Setting t h e Bounds of Childhood
There can be little doubt the most potent influence on a child
is his family. Once children leave the home and begin to lead
their own lives, however, this influence and the need to maintain
the privacy of child-parent communication may be expected to
decrease. In other words, the potential destructiveness of forced
disclosure on the future of the relationship would be greatly lessened, as would the repugnance to such a procedure. That is not
t o say the forced disclosure would have no impact on the relation;
it could affect the parent-child relationship. But, in view of the
presumptive maturity of the adult child and due to the probable
decrease in the frequency and necessity for confidential communications between parent and child, the impact of forced disclosure on the relationship could be expected to significantly decrease. As an adult, no longer within the family structure on a
day-to-day basis nor dependent upon it for counsel and sustenance, such a "child" would be in a different position than an
unemancipated minor.
The delicate balance between the significant state interest in
149. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
150. Even the privilege against self-incrimination is subject to waiver. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
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fact accumulation and the familial interest in communicative
privacy in the case of an emancipated child would be tipped in
favor of the state and disclosure could be compelled. Given the
importance of the state interest, the decrease in the significance
of the relationship, and the declining impact of disclosure on that
relationship, a contrary result in the case of emancipated children
would amount to exaltation of theory over the practical realities
of life.

C. Actions in Which the Parent and Child Become Adverse
Once the parties to a confidential communication become
adverse parties in litigation, the rationale mandating the privacy
of their communications has vanished. Thus, in a divorce action
either spouse may testify concerning confidential communications;lJ1in an action by the client against his lawyer the attorney
may reveal otherwise excludable confidences;lJ2and in an action
for malpractice the physician may divulge confidences he generally could not reveal.'" Once the parties become adverse as to a
matter that relates to the communication, there is no good reason
for suppressing testimony as to the substance of the communication. The need to foster the relationship by protecting its confidences is obviated once the relationship has detiorated to the point
the communicants acquire adverse legal interests, as in the case
of a wife who is beaten by her husband.
The argument against such an exception would be that since
the right to communicative privacy is constitutionally based, it
simply cannot be diluted. The right of privacy, however, is not
absolute. When parent and child have adverse interests in a legal
dispute they in truth are wearing two hats: first, they are adversaries; and second, they are members of the same family. By
involving themselves in such a dispute the parent and child have
removed the communication from the "private realm of family
life which the state may not enter,"lJ4and have, by putting the
particular matter in dispute, called into question the evidence
necessary to resolve the dispute.lJ5Once the parent or child vio151. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 4 84, at 171; 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2338.
supra note 8, $ 91, at 191.
152. MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, § 2385.
153. Id. 8 104; 8 WIGMORE,
154. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
155. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415,467 P.2d 557,85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970),wherein
the court held that a litigant who puts a matter in controversy may not interpose a
privilege, even though the privilege may have a constitutional basis in the right of privacy.
See also Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), noted in 10 LOY.L. REV.
696 (1977).
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lates the rights of the other communicants, by subjecting him to
a beating for example, he should not be able to exclude the evidence of his misdeeds by recourse to the privilege. Thus, a court
or legislature would be justified in allowing the parent to testify
in cases where parent and child are adverse parties.

D. The Holder of the Privilege
Suppose A's son, C, relates in confidence to A the fact he has
committed a crime. A firmly believes C should turn himself in
and counsels C to do so. C fears doing so will ruin his chances for
acceptance a t law school and refuses. A goes to the police and is
called as a witness at trial. Should C be able to claim the privilege
and suppress the testimony?
In the case of the attorney-client relation, the desire of the
attorney to reveal a client's confidence is of no import since the
privilege belongs to the client.lMThe same is generally true of the
physician-patient privilege.'" In the case of the husband-wife
privilege, a spouse may prevent testimony concerning a confidential communication despite the willingness of his partner to testify.15% is reasoned that allowing the state to reach confidential
communications when one of the parties is willing to divulge the
substance of such communications would not prevent apprehension of full disclosure. Arguably, if a child knows a parent may
later betray him even though the parent could not be forced to
do so, there exists a disincentive to fully talk out all of his problems. Just as the relational privileges allow the communicant to
prevent the testimony of his cocommunicant, even though the
cocommunicant is willing to testify, it could be argued the child
should be able to prevent testimony concerning confidential communications despite the willingness or desire of his parent to
testify.
There is, however, an argument to be made in favor of the
proposition that a parent should be able to reveal such confidences over the objections of his child. In most cases parents are
in a better position than the child to know what would be in the
child's best interest.'" Perhaps the confidence Terry's mother
revealed to the court resulted in the very kind of experience required to prevent Terry from becoming a truly nefarious characlfi6. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 4 92, at 192.
157. Both Wigmore and McCormick state that the privilege belongs to the patient.
MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 4 102, at 218; 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 12, 8 2386, at 851.
158. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 8 83.
159. Hafen, supra note 71, at 651-56.
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ter. A close examination of the cases establishing a zone of familial autonomy reveals that the right consists largely of the rights
of parents to the care, custody, control, and upbringing of their
children."O Hence, the parent-child communication privilege is
arguably held only by the parent; the parent, considering the best
interest of the child, decides whether to withold information or
whether to disclose such information. To prevent him from doing
so may well be an invasion of his constitutionally protected right
to make decisions with respect to the upbringing of his children.
Yet the constitutional rights of the parents are not the only
constitutional rights that may be asserted. The child has an autonomy interest in making the decision of whether to communicate certain confidences to his parents. However, although the
Supreme Court has accorded minors most of the constitutional
rights enjoyed by adults,161the Court, noting the special position
that children occupy in the social scheme, has recognized in a
number of cases that the privacy rights of minors ar not coequal
with those of adults.Ib2Because a parent may in fact know what
course of action is in the best interests of the child and because
the right of the parent to disclose is a t least coequal with the right
of the child to prevent disclosure, there should be a requirement
that the parent participate in claiming the privilege.Ib3
160. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp.
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
161. See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV.
L. REV.1001, 1008-09 (1975).
162. The cases that afford minors lesser rights than adults in the privacy area are
discussed in Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action after
Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM.
L. REV.1216, 1227-33 (1977).
163. The court in People v. Doe hinted that the privilege should be allowable only if
all the family members participated in claiming the privilege. 61 A.D.2d a t 435 n.9, 403
N.Y.S.2d a t 381 n.9.
These proposed exceptions to a parent-child privilege are not the only exceptions a
court or legislature may wish to consider. One notable example might be the distinction
between "acts and facts." Since the basic impetus of most privileges derives from the
belief that persons involved in certain relationships should be free from apprehension of
disclosure, the protection of the privilege in many jurisdictions extends only to communications or communicative acts but not to noncommunicative acts. If the act is not intended to communicate then the apprehension of disclosure that the privilege is designed
to guard against would not be alleviated by protecting any information obtained, and
supra note 8, 4 79 (husband-wife privilege); 8
disclosure may be compelled. MCCORMICK,
WIGMORE,
supra note 12, !j 2306 (attorney-client privilege). Although the majority rule is
supra note 8, 4 79, a t 164; 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 187,
probably to the contrary, MCCORMICK,
188-89 (1949), there is a substantial minority to the effect that the viewing of noncommunicative acts is not a privileged matter. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, 4 79, a t 164. While
protection of parent-child communications or acts intended to communicate are essential
to keep the lines of communication open, the protection of viewing noncommwnicative
acts may not be.
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the exception of the husband-wife relationship, it simply cannot be argued that the relationships now protected by the
panoply of privilege are more important to society (and the individuals involved) than the parent-child relationship. It is an anomoly that a purely clinical relationship such as the physicianpatient relationship seemingly commands more respect in the
legal world than does the fundamental relationship of parent and
child. There is nothing more deeply rooted in our history and
tradition, and indeed in our Constitution, than the sanctity of the
family.Is4While the importance of the state interest in fact accumulation cannot be ignored, it should not be exalted to a relative
importance it does not possess.
Neither of the competing state or familial interests is an
absolute. Striking a balance between these two interests may be
accomplished, as it has in the contexts of other relational privileges, by recognizing the privilege but allowing for exceptions in
appropriate circumstances. While the list of possible exceptions
catalogued here is not exhaustive, it does form a starting point
for serious consideration of the conflict between parent-child
communicative privacy and the demands of effective law enforcement.

Bruce Neal Lemons
-

-

Although the relational privileges generally protect communications that reveal past
illegal conduct, they do not protect attempts to utilize them to protect a present fraud or
supra note 8, 4 95 (attorney-client); ~ o & s e l l &Crippin,
other illegal conduct. MCCORMICK,
Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN.L. REV.413, 421 (1956); Husband- WifePrivileges, supra
note 29, at 227-28 & n.108 (husband-wife). Privileges generally may be asserted only to
foster a relationship-allowing the parent and child to commit fraud via the privilege
simply has no beneficial effect on the relationship and should not be allowed.
Some privileges are limited in their application to civil or criminal matters. Disclosures of confidential communications in civil cases where the child would not be the
subject of criminal investigation would arguably not have as great an impact on the
parent-child relation and should be allowed.
Another matter meriting serious attention would be the conditions upon which the
privilege would be waived. Since a constitutional right is involved, the waiver would
probably have to be a knowing one. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
164. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).

